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Nagaland’s Demographic Somersault
Ankush Agrawal, Vikas Kumar
After two decades of very high growth, Nagaland’s 
population declined between 2001 and 2011 though 
there were no epidemical diseases, wars, famines, 
natural calamities, political disturbances, or any 
significant changes in the state’s socio-economic 
characteristics. This decline is unprecedented in the 
history of independent India. It has been shown that the 
census estimates of the state’s population for 1981-2001 
are internally inconsistent. In the light of this, this paper 
uses information from the Sample Registration System 
and National Family Health Surveys to examine the 
reliability of the census figures in Nagaland between 
1971 and 2011. It suggests that the census estimates are 
inconsistent with these sources of information.
1 Introduction
The unavailability of reliable information impedes s ocial-scientifi c studies on the smaller states in north-east I ndia. National-level surveys either do not cover the 
smaller states of the region (for instance, various waves of 
R ural Economic and Demographic Surveys) or cover them ir-
regularly (for instance, the District Level Household and Facil-
ity Survey did not cover Nagaland in 2007-08). Even some of 
the surveys that cover the region regularly do not have suffi -
ciently representative samples to generate reliable estimates 
for the smaller states (for instance, National Sample Surveys). 
The decennial census is, therefore, the most important source 
of demographic and other related information on the smaller 
states of the north-east, and its reliability is of utmost impor-
tance to policymakers and social scientists.
Unfortunately, doubts have emerged over the reliability of 
census fi gures on the north-east region. The census has re-
corded abnormal changes in the population of some states in 
the region. For instance, Nagaland, the most fecund state in 
the country between 1981 and 2001, recorded a negative popu-
lation growth in the 2011 Census (Figure 1). During 1981-91 
and 1991-2001, the state registered decadal population growth 
rates of 56.08% and 64.53%, respectively.1 However, between 
2001 and 2011, Nagaland’s population declined. This is the fi rst 
time in independent India that a state has witnessed an abso-
lute decline in population in the absence of epidemical dis-
eases, wars, famines, natural calamities, political distur-
bances, and signifi cant changes in the socio-economic corre-
lates of fertility.2 
While observers drew attention to Nagaland’s high growth 
rate and its developmental consequences as early as the 1970s 
(Means 1971), the government seemed to have taken note of it 
only when it rejected the 2001 Census (GOI 2011b: viii). Despite 
the government’s rejection of the 2001 Census, state and 
non-state organisations continue to use its fl awed population 
Figure 1: Decadal Population Growth Rates (1971-2011, in %) 
Source: Sharma and Kar (1997); GOI (2011a).
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Table 1: Actual and Projected Populations of Nagaland (1981-2011)
Year Source Population (in ’000) Error 
  Projected Actual (%)*
1981 Expert Committee (1974) 714.5 774.9 -7.80
1991 Expert Committee (1974) 957.9 1,209.55 -20.80
2001 Technical Group (1988) 1,721 1,990.0 -13.52
2011 Technical Group (1988) 2,185 1,980.6 10.32
2011 Technical Group (2001) 2,249 1,980.6 13.55
2011 PFI-PRB (2007) 2,426-2,439** 1,980.6 22.49-23.14**
* Error (per cent) is the excess of the projected over actual population as a share of the 
actual population.
** PFI-PRB (2007: 6, 11) provides two projections, corresponding to low and high fertility 
scenarios.
Sources: (i) Expert committee (1974): GOI (1978: 158-59), (ii) Technical group (1988): 
GOI (1996: 64), and (iii) Technical group (2001): GOI (2006: 35).
statistics. For instance, the Economic Survey of 2010-11 (GOI 
2011d: A125) used the wrong population series for Nagaland, 
which resulted in erroneous estimates of some human devel-
opment indicators. Similarly, other surveys uncritically refer 
to the 2001 Census of Nagaland as a benchmark (for instance, 
CSDS 2008: 3).
Although the dramatic changes in Nagaland’s population 
were discussed extensively in the north-east in the run-up to 
the 2011 Census (Nagaland Post 2009), social scientists largely 
ignored the issue. Three possible explanations emerged from 
these discussions. First, migration was invoked to explain the 
demographic change. It was argued that net outmigration 
from the state could have caused its population to decline be-
tween 2001 and 2011 (Chaurasia 2011; Kundu and Kundu 2011). 
On the other hand, others argued that net in-migration was 
responsible for the high population growth rate between 1991 
and 2001 (Rio 2010; Singh 2009). Second, HIV/AIDS and drug 
addiction were invoked to explain the decline in population 
between 2001 and 2011 (Jeermison 2011). Third, the struggle 
among tribes for political power and development funds was 
cited by the chief minister as the reason behind the abnormal 
growth between 1991 and 2001 (Hazarika 2005). However, a 
systematic empirical investigation of these and other plausible 
explanations has not been conducted so far (for exceptions, 
see Agrawal and Kumar 2012b, d).
This paper examines Nagaland’s demographic somersault – 
the decline in population after two decades of abnormally 
high growth. Section 2 draws attention to the discrepancy 
between the actual and projected populations of Nagaland 
over the past three decades. It also draws attention to other 
sources that raised doubts about the reliability of the census 
of Nagaland. Section 3 examines the plausibility of the census 
population estimates by comparing them with information 
from the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) and Sample 
Registration System (SRS). This section also examines a 
political- geographic explanation of population changes in 
Nagaland and outlines a political-economic explanation. The 
fi nal s ection offers concluding remarks.
2 Growing Concerns about the Census of Nagaland
During the past three decades, Nagaland’s population repeat-
edly defi ed projections (Table 1). To begin with, the expert 
committee of 1974 underestimated the 1991 population by 
about 20%. The underestimation indicated that the dynamics 
of population growth between 1981 and 1991 were inconsistent 
with the trends in fertility and mortality prevailing in the 
1960s and 1970s, which the committee used for the projec-
tions. Similarly, the technical group of 1988, which based its 
projections on the socio-economic and demographic condi-
tions prevailing in the 1980s and used the 1991 Census as the 
baseline, underestimated the 2001 population by 14%. Under-
estimation for 2001 despite an infl ated baseline (1991 Census) 
meant that population growth between 1991 and 2001 was 
very high. Further, the 2001 Census was conducted by both 
A ssam and Nagaland in 62 villages in the disputed territory 
along the Assam-Nagaland border and the “population [of the 
disputed villages] enumerated by Assam is consistently lower 
than that enumerated by Nagaland” (GOI 2005: 24).
Interestingly, the leading political fi gures of the region, in-
cluding Nagaland’s Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio and Manipur’s 
former Chief Minister Radhabinod Koijam, disputed the 2001 
Census estimates. According to the former, the state’s popula-
tion in 2001 was only 1.4 million (Hazarika 2005), whereas the 
latter estimated it to be 1.6 million (Koijam 2001). Also, while 
the census records progressively increased the rate of growth 
of Nagaland’s population until 2001 (Figure 1), studies based 
on the census data indicated a declining trend in crude birth 
rate (GOI 1997c; Guilmoto and Rajan 2002). A sample survey 
conducted in six districts of Nagaland in 2009 added to grow-
ing doubts about the 2001 Census. Compared to the 2001 
C ensus, it found fewer people in almost all parts of the state 
(Nagaland Post 2009).
While the forecasts for 1991 and 2001 happened to be under-
estimates vis-à-vis the corresponding censuses, the forecasts 
for 2011 were overestimates (Table 1). The technical groups on 
population projections constituted in 1988 and 2001 overesti-
mated the 2011 population of Nagaland by 10% and 14% res-
pectively. Still later, in 2007, the Population Reference Bureau 
and the Population Foundation of India overestimated the 
2011 population by 23%.
3 Feasibility of Census Population Estimates
This section examines whether births and deaths and lawful 
migration can explain the abnormal changes in Nagaland’s 
population. The analysis is restricted to 1971-2011 as the pre- 
and post-1971 Censuses cannot be compared directly – because 
of the steady expansion of the area of the Naga Hills until the 
formation of Nagaland in 1963 (GOI 1975: 4) and also because 
of the increasing coverage of census operations (GOI 2011b).
3.1 Birth and Death Rates
Demographic data from the NFHS and SRS can be used to vali-
date the census estimates of population growth rates. Table 2 
(p 71) compiles estimates of the crude birth rate (CBR) from 
these sources since 1971. SRS (NFHS) estimates of the CBR for 
Nagaland are lower (higher) than the estimates for India.
For each decade, Table 2 provides estimates of the natural 
growth rate (NGR) corresponding to the NFHS and SRS birth 
rates for two scenarios – one assuming zero death rates, NGR (0), 
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Table 2: Birth, Death, and Natural Growth Rates
Period Data Nagaland India
  Source Birth Death NGR (0) NGR Birth Death NGR (0) NGR
   Rate Rate  (SRS) Rate Rate  (SRS)
1971-1981 – Census decadal growth rates: 50.05 (Nagaland) and 24.66 (India)
 1976-1981 (average) SRS 21.88 6.87 24.16 16.07 33.67 13.67 39.26 21.90
1981-1991 – Census decadal growth rates: 56.08 (Nagaland) and 23.86 (India)
 1983-1991 (average) SRS 21.41 5.02 23.60 17.65 28.82 10 32.86 20.50
1991-2001 – Census decadal growth rates: 64.53 (Nagaland) and 21.54 (India)
 1991-94 (average) SRS 19.45 4.02 21.24 16.54 24.65 8.95 27.57 16.86
 1990-92 NFHS-1 31.3 NA 36.10 30.88 28.7 NA 32.71 21.60
 1996-98 NFHS-2 30.4 NA 34.91 29.74 24.8 NA 27.76 17.03
2001-2011 – Census decadal growth rates: -0.47 (Nagaland) and 17.64 (India)
 2004-09 (average) SRS 16.61 4.25 17.91 13.07 23.3 7.45 25.90 17.03
 2003-05 NFHS-3 28.5 NA 32.45 27.07 23.6 NA 26.27 17.38
(i) Birth rate is the number of live births per 1,000 population and death rate is the number of deaths per 1,000 
population; (ii) NGR stands for natural growth rate, NGR (0) denotes the decadal NGR of “closed” (no migration) 
population assuming a zero death rate and NGR (SRS), assuming the SRS death rate for the corresponding 
decade. NGR (0) [NGR (SRS)] has been arrived at by calculating compound growth rate using birth rate (birth 
and death rates); (iii) The figures for 1976–81 for Nagaland are based only on the rural sample, which does not 
severely affect our estimates because the share of rural population in the state’s population was 90% and 85% 
respectively, in 1971 and 1981; and (iv) NA indicates non-availability of data.
Source: (i) Srivastava (1987), (ii) GOI (1999a and 2011b), (iii) IIPS and MI (2007: 78 and 2009: 36), and (iv) SRS 
birth and death rates for 2004-09 (average) have been compiled from SRS Bulletins for the respective years.
and another assuming a death rate equal to the SRS death rate, 
NGR (SRS). The observed population growth of the country as a 
whole lies within the range spanned by NGR (SRS) and NGR (0), 
whereas for Nagaland the CBRs cannot support the observed 
population growth even when the crude death rate is assumed 
to be zero. Further, neither the NFHS nor SRS reported substan-
tial changes in the birth and death rates between 1991-2001 
and 2001-11, which rules out the possibility of explaining the 
decline in population between 2001 and 2011 by transition to a 
low birth-and-death rates regime.
The inferences based on the NGR derived from NFHS and SRS 
birth rates (Table 2) are supported by evidence from other 
studies. For instance, Bhowmik et al (1971: 74-75) found that in 
1961 the CBR among the Zemi Nagas of Benreu village (Peren) 
was 49.77 per 1,000 population, which compares with the cor-
responding fi gure for India as a whole, 41.7 during 1951-60. 
Similarly, Murry et al (2005) found that the CBR among the 
Lothas in a village in Wokha was 28.35 per 1,000 population 
(the survey period is not mentioned though it appears to be 
sometime during 1991-2001). This fi gure is close to CBR esti-
mates for Nagaland (30.4 for 1996-98 from NFHS-2 in Table 2) 
and rural India (29.4 for 1995-97 from the SRS) (GOI 1999b).
Since births and deaths are alone insuffi cient to explain the 
decline in Nagaland’s population, the decline has to be explained 
almost entirely by either substantial outmigration d uring 
2001-11 and/or overestimation of the population in earlier cen-
suses. But before discussing these possibilities, we will rule out 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic-based explanation.
There are strong grounds for rejecting the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic-based explanation for the decline in population growth 
rate during 2001-11. While Nagaland is among the six worst 
HIV/AIDS affected states in India (Government of Nagaland 
2010: 121), the resultant deaths (564 deaths between 1994 and 
July 2011) are too few to explain the dramatic changes in the 
state’s population (Nagaland State AIDS Control Society 2011). 
Three additional reasons rule out this explanation. First, with 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates comparable to Nagaland 
(0.78%), the populations of Manipur (1.4%) and 
Andhra Pradesh (0.90%) did not shrink (NACO and 
NIMS nd; GOI 2010). Second, Nagaland registered 
spectacular population growth during the 1990s 
despite a comparable prevalence of HIV/AIDS. 
Third, population growth was positive in districts 
with high HIV/AIDS prevalence – Dimapur and Tu-
ensang, for instance, where the population grew 
by 23.13% and 5.81% respectively – and negative 
in districts with low HIV/AIDS prevalence Mon, 
for instance, which registered a 4% decline in 
population (Bachani et al 2011; GOI 2011b, c).
3.2 Migration
Migration has long been a contentious issue in 
Nagaland, where the majority community, the 
Nagas, are committed to the maintenance of the 
Inner Line system that bars outsiders from enter-
ing large parts of the state without offi cial per-
mission. We will begin the probe on migration by noting that if 
in-migration was the dominant cause of population growth 
between 1981 and 2001, then the subsequent absolute decline 
in population will require substantial net outmigration from 
the state. Chaurasia (2011: 15), implicitly assuming that there is no 
abnormality in the 2001 Census estimate and using SRS (2004-09) 
birth and death rates, overestimates the 2011 population of 
Nagaland by 14% and attributes the discrepancy to “a very 
heavy outmigration (almost 14%) between 2001 and 2011”. 
While the migration data of the 2011 Census are not yet avail-
able, any outmigration based explanation of the absolute de-
cline in Nagaland’s population after abnormal growth would 
be implausible because the number of outmigrants during 
2001-11 needed to account for the population decline would far 
exceed 83,083, the number of outmigrants during the entire 
1971-2001 period (GOI 1977: 84-85, 1988: 318-19, nd1, nd2).
Though ad hoc invocation of migration as the root cause of 
Nagaland’s population change can be rejected straightaway, a 
political-geographic explanation – people migrating to cope 
with arbitrary colonial and postcolonial boundaries, leading 
to unexpected shifts in population dynamics – would bear closer 
scrutiny. It has often been argued that postcolonial inter-
national as well as intra-national boundaries have on the one 
hand divided many seamless communities and their homelands, 
and on the other corralled unwilling partners within rigid 
boundaries.3 While claims about ethno-cultural and political 
unity of the Naga tribes spread across the hilly border between 
India and Myanmar and their political isolation from the out-
side world do not stand scrutiny (Sema 1986, for instance), it is 
true that a number of Naga and other related tribes are distri-
buted across Myanmar and different north-eastern states like 
Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. We need 
to check if confl icts rooted in colonial (between Myanmar and 
India) and postcolonial (between north-eastern states) bound-
aries have generated demographic gradients pushing people, 
say, into Nagaland from neighbouring states and countries.
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One could argue that ethnic confl ict and/or economic hard-
ship are pushing Nagas from other jurisdictions into Nagaland. 
(Even other tribes could be fl eeing from confl ict hotspots in 
Nagaland’s neighbourhood.) But in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
level of confl ict and economic development did not vary sub-
stantially across Nagaland’s neighbourhood to support an 
infl ux into the state on a scale that can explain the dramatic 
increase in population. Exceptions such as the Naga-Kuki con-
fl ict in Manipur’s hill districts during the 1990s pushed Kukis 
away from rather than towards Naga-dominated areas. Even if 
it is assumed that an infl ux can explain the abnormal increase 
in population, the complementary assumption that there was 
a reverse fl ow in the following decade is highly implausible 
because in the latest census decade Nagaland did not witness 
any signifi cant increase in confl ict relative to its neighbour-
hood. On the contrary, if anything, in-migration to Nagaland 
should have increased during 2001-11 because of the ceasefi re 
between various insurgent groups and the government, which 
created an unprecedentedly peaceful environment in the state.
So far we have argued that (lawful) migration recorded in 
the census cannot alone explain both very high population 
growth rates in Nagaland for three decades (1971-2001) and 
the negative growth in the subsequent decade (2001-11). But 
migration could arguably explain high growth rates during 
1971-2001 if there was massive in-migration from other states 
and countries. Statistics on migration indicate that even this 
restricted explanation is implausible for four reasons. First, 
migrants constituted about 5% of Nagaland’s population in 
both 1991 and 2001 and only 40% of these migrants were from 
outside the state (Table 3).4 Therefore, migrants from outside 
Nagaland constituted nearly 2% of its population in both years. 
Second, the share of in-migrants from other states and coun-
tries in Nagaland’s population has been falling over time, mak-
ing in-migration an unlikely cause of increasing population 
growth rate during 1981-2001 (Table 3). Third, if only intra- 
national boundaries are considered, the number of potential set-
tlers belonging to Naga and related tribes of Arunachal Pradesh 
and Assam are too few to account for the massive changes in 
Nagaland’s population (GOI nd4, nd5). Migration of north 
M anipur’s large tribal population related to the Naga tribes of 
Nagaland cannot explain the higher growth rate because dur-
ing the period under consideration the relevant districts of 
M anipur – Ukhrul and Senapati – recorded very high growth 
rates (GOI nd4, nd5) despite outmigration of Kuki tribes to 
other districts due to ethnic confl ict. Fourth, we have not 
come across media or offi cial sources referring to large-scale 
movement of Naga and related tribes from other north-eastern 
states into Nagaland. But note that while the census clearly 
suggests that lawful migration cannot help explain the 
abnormal demographic changes in Nagaland, it cannot help 
us examine if illegal migration from Myanmar and Bangladesh 
can explain it.
We also carry out an analysis using the population balanc-
ing equation by combining the information on births, deaths, 
and migration for 1971-2011 (see Agrawal and Kumar 2012b, d 
for details). These internal consistency checks suggest that 
three successive censuses between 1981 and 2001 seem to have 
overestimated Nagaland’s population by about 4%, 11% and 
17% respectively.
3.3 Discussion
Demographic factors alone are insuffi cient to explain the 
changes in Nagaland’s population. The analysis also suggests 
that the political-geographic hypothesis – people migrating to 
cope with arbitrary colonial and postcolonial boundaries, 
leading to unexpected shifts in population dynamics – cannot 
explain the changes in the state’s population if only lawful 
m igration is considered. While there is no reliable data on ille-
gal international immigration, the available evidence does not 
fully support the corresponding political-geographic hypothe-
sis (Agrawal and Kumar 2012d). Illegal international immigra-
tion can, if at all, partly explain abnormal growth between 
1981 and 2001 without being able to explain the subsequent 
steep decline in growth. Hence, other factors like political- 
economic factors need to be examined in future work.
Our preliminary analysis partly supports a political- 
economic explanation – competing subgroups of population 
infl ated their numbers to seek greater political representation 
and, by implication, a greater share in the state’s resources – of 
the changes in Nagaland’s population between 1991 and 2011 
(Agrawal and Kumar 2012c, d). Different Naga tribes seem to 
have infl ated their numbers in the census of 2001 to avoid loss 
of political representation to competing tribes and non-tribal 
plainsmen due to the impending delimitation of constituencies. 
Ultimately, inter-tribal confl ict and litigation forced deferment 
of delimitation in Nagaland to the fi rst census after 2026 
(GOI 2008). So, there was no incentive in 2011 to infl ate the 
population. Preliminary analysis indicates that the infl ation of 
population across Kohima, Mokokchung, and Tuensang – the 
three broad geographic and ethnic divisions of Nagaland – in 
the 2001 Census was related to the expected loss of political 
representation due to delimitation, whereas defl ation of popu-
lation in the census of 2011 is related to the infl ation in the 
preceding decade (Agrawal and Kumar 2012c, d). But a 
d efi nitive conclusion on this can be arrived at only after an 
analysis of abnormalities in the census at the level of assembly 
constituencies and circles.
4 Concluding Remarks
Developing states such as India need information on the s ocio-
economic division of their populations to design re distributive 
policies. But the offi cial statistics of India are not free of errors 
(Agrawal and Kumar 2012a).5 The census, which occupies 
Table 3: Share of Migrants in Nagaland’s Population (1971-2001, in %)
Type of migration 1971 1981 1991 2001
All in-migrants* 12.64 15.33 5.74 4.36
Intrastate** 48.29 62.38 61.96 59.24
Interstate** 42.16 34.00 35.31 38.74
International** 9.56 3.62 2.73 2.02
In-migrants from outside the state* 6.54 5.77 2.20 1.78
* As proportion of state’s total population.
** As proportion of in-migrants.
Source: Computations based on GOI (1976: 28, 24; 1977: 84-85; 1985: 34, 48, 50; 1988: 
318-19; 1997a: 52-53; 1997b: 6, 40, 52; nd1, nd2).
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pride of place in India’s offi cial statistics and is viewed as inte-
gral to nation-building (GOI nd3), is a case in point. We exam-
ined a largely ignored surprise thrown up by the 2011 Census 
– after two decades of abnormally high growth, Nagaland’s 
population declined in absolute terms during 2001-11.
Using four different sources (past projections, statements of 
political leaders, sample surveys, and overlapping censuses), we 
argued that Nagaland’s census has been plagued by problems 
since at least the early 1990s. In earlier work, we have shown 
that the census population estimates are internally i nconsistent 
(Agrawal and Kumar 2012b, d). Here we showed that the 
aforesaid estimates are also inconsistent with other sources 
of demographic information and argued that d emographic 
e xplanations alone are insuffi cient to explain the dramatic 
changes in Nagaland’s population. We then outlined potential 
alternatives to demographic explanations, one of which – a 
political-geographic explanation – was discussed alongside the 
demographic explanation. But our discussion of the political-
geographic explanation is incomplete because of lack of relia-
ble data on the scale of international illegal immigration. We 
also briefl y outlined a political-economic explanation that 
needs to be examined in future work.
We conclude by noting that the inconsistencies in successive 
censuses – the most important source of information about 
smaller states such as Nagaland – and the uncritical use of 
questionable statistics by government agencies raise ques-
tions about the Indian state’s institutional capacity to design 
 empirically-informed policies.
Notes
 1 During this period, Nagaland was among the 
fastest growing regions in the world. The number 
of countries whose population grew faster than 
that of Nagaland decreased from six in 1980-
90 to two in 1990-2000, and then increased to 
more than 150 in 2010 (United N ations 2011). A 
comparison of Nagaland’s growth rate with 
growth rates of provinces in other countries, 
which would have been more appropriate, 
could not be carried out for want of data.
 2 The population of Punjab decreased between 
1941 and 1951 (GOI 2011a). The 1941 Census 
over-enumerated the population of Punjab due 
to competition between Hindus and Muslims, 
and the same was corrected in the 1951 Census 
(Natrajan 1972: vii; GOI 1954: 5). Other factors 
that contributed to the decrease included pop-
ulation transfer and unprecedented bloodshed 
following the partition. There was also a de-
crease in the population of two union territo-
ries, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (during 
1941-1951) and Daman and Diu (during 1951-
1961) (GOI 2011a), most likely due to out-migra-
tion triggered by the reorganisation of India’s 
territories.
  Epidemics: For instance, the 1921 Census was 
carried out after an infl uenza epidemic. “In 
some areas where the epidemic was exception-
ally severe, some increase in omission [relative 
to other colonial censuses]” was suspected 
(GOI 1954: 4).
  Famines: The drop in growth rate of Bengal be-
tween 1941 and 1951 was attributed to both 
over-enumeration in 1941 as well as the 1943 
famine (Natrajan 1972: vii).
  Socio-economic correlates: The key socio-eco-
nomic correlates of fertility are income, litera-
cy, level of urbanisation, female work partici-
pation, and access to public health services 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 407-8). In 
N agaland, fertility has been shown to be in-
versely related to female literacy and the 
standard of living and directly related to child 
mortality (Dey and Goswami 2009; Narendra 
Singh 2005). There was no change in the above 
correlates that could support an abrupt decline 
in population through a decline in fertility. In 
fact, Nagaland’s human development rank has 
improved steadily over the last four decades 
(see Agrawal and Kumar 2012d for details).
 3 The debate has mostly focused on Africa, 
where a number of national and sub-national 
boundaries are straight lines, and is polarised 
between those who are appalled at the arti-
fi ciality of these boundaries (Alesina et al 2006) 
and those who argue that the discourse of 
a rtifi ciality betrays ignorance of ground reali-
ties (Herbst 2000; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996).
 4 We have taken into account “migration by 
place of last residence” with a reference period 
of 0-9 years so that only those individuals who 
changed residence between inter-census peri-
ods are considered.
 5 India’s offi cial statistics in other fi elds have 
also been questioned in the past few years. In 
July 2011, the governor of the Reserve Bank of 
India expressed concern over the quality of 
 statistics collected by government agencies 
(Subbarao 2011). A few months later, the com-
merce secretary admitted that India’s export 
fi gures for April-October were infl ated by $9.4 
billion due to a misclassifi cation of certain items 
and data entry errors (Business Line 2011). Not 
long afterward, the chief statistician conceded 
that the accuracy of the Index of Industrial Pro-
duction was questionable (Financial Express 
2011). More recently, the Planning Commis-
sion’s deputy chairman argued that National 
Sample Surveys systematically underestimate 
household consumption (Economic Times 2012).
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